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ABSTRACT
Preferred modes of thinking, otherwise known as biases, have been well
documented in adult reasoning and decision-making (Evans, 2003; Gilovich,
Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman,
1986). Researchers have explained these biases by proposing that the basis for
them is a system of thought that relies mostly on intuition and “gut feelings”
rather than logical analysis of the situation (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1986). According to standard dual-process theories, intuition is
described as a thought process so quick, it is automatic and, at times
unconscious; conversely, analytical thinking is slow and steady, involving
analysis and conscious deliberation (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Though several
dual-process models for cognition have been proposed, including system
1/system 2, prototype/willingness, and the hot/cold empathy gap, only fuzzy-trace
theory offers concrete predictions concerning development that are consistent
with known data (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Reyna & Casillas, 2009). For
example, research has shown that adults display greater reasoning biases than
children, in that adults are more likely than children to process and use
extraneous information, such as inconsequential differences in wording, in their
decisions (Jacobs & Potenza, 1991; Reyna & Ellis, 1994). Of interest for the
current study, fuzzy-trace theory posits that different ways of processing lead to
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different outcomes in risk-taking behavior. Further, fuzzy-trace theory proposes a
framework that explains how risk perception changes across the lifespan and
how these changes often lead to less risk-taking from childhood and adolescence
into adulthood (Reyna, 2012; Reyna et al., 2018; Reyna & Adam, 2003; Reyna &
Farley, 2006).
Keywords: risk-taking, fuzzy-trace theory, criminality, decision-making, framing
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INTRODUCTION
Fuzzy-Trace Theory
Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) is an empirically supported theory about
memory, judgment, and decision-making across the life span (Reyna, 2012;
Reyna & Brainerd, 2011, 1995, 1991). The central idea of fuzzy-trace theory is
that different mental representations are encoded, stored, retrieved, and
forgotten separately and roughly in parallel (Broniatowski & Reyna, 2018; Reyna,
2012; Reyna & Casillas, 2009). These memory representations include gist and
verbatim representations. Gist representations are memory forms of the absolute
meaning or substance of a construct without regard to the exact numbers, words,
or pictures (Broniatowski & Reyna, 2018; Reyna, 2012). In other words, gist is a
symbolic representation of meaning for each stimulus (Reyna, 2012).
Conversely, verbatim memory is the surface form representation of memory,
including exact numbers, words, and pictures (Broniatowski & Reyna, 2018;
Reyna, 2012). “Fuzzy-trace” refers to the difference between “fuzzy” gist
representations and vivid verbatim representations (Reyna & Casillas, 2009). In
general, adults exemplify a fuzzy-processing preference, wherein information is
encoded in both gist and verbatim representations (Reyna, 2012). The default
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decision is to allow less precise, gist representations to set the course of action
whenever possible, hence fuzzy-processing preference (Reyna, 2012). Adults
begin with the lowest, or categorical, level of gist, and only proceed to higher, or
more precise, levels when the lower levels do not discriminate between options
enough to allow them to complete a task, such as choosing between two options
in a choice task (Reyna, 2015, 2012). For example, problems with choices
phrases as “less money is won” or “more money is won” represent more precise
levels of gist than “some money is won” or “no money is won” (Reyna, 2012).
The Influence of Verbatim and Gist Processing on Decision-Making
Based on previous research, Reyna and Brainerd (2011) identified five
components of decision-making including: 1) stored knowledge or values, 2)
mental representations of problems or situations, 3) retrieval of knowledge and
values, 4) implementation of knowledge and values, and 5) individual and
developmental differences in monitoring and inhibiting interference, all of which
can contribute to reasoning and decision-making. Stored knowledge and values
refer to long-term education, experiences, and instilled values from childhood,
including cultural values (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Mental representations refer
to two distinct ways individuals perceive situations, either gist-based or verbatimbased processing (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Gist processing is qualitative and
draws on meaning and components extracted from the information presented,
including emotional meaning (Mills, Reyna, & Estrada, 2008; Reyna, 2012, 2004;
2

Reyna et al., 2015). Reyna and Brainerd (2011) explain that the meaning of the
gist of a problem or situation is subjectively based on emotion, education, culture,
experience, and worldview (Reyna, 2008, 2004; Reyna & Adam, 2003). When
applied to decisions, gist-based processing relies on intuitive and global
assessments, rather than trading-off between values, or a cost-benefit analysis.
For instance, if confronted with a problem or situation that requires a decision,
gist-based processing would involve a global assessment of risk (e.g., “Is there
risk involved?”) as opposed to calculating risks (e.g., “Do the benefits outweigh
the risks?”). On the contrary, when applied to decisions, verbatim-processes are
specific and involve quantitative analysis (e.g., “How much risk is there?”).
Retrieval of relevant values is an important part of the decision process, as
people must access what is valuable to them in each situation; although, even
deeply held values may not be retrieved when needed, introducing variance
within individuals in reasoning and decision-making (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011).
Implementation is putting together what is perceived about a situation (i.e.,
mental representations) with what is known and valued (gist representations that
are retrieved from long-term memory) by the decision-maker (Reyna & Brainerd,
2011). In other words, when confronted with a decision, it is important to use
personal values (e.g., “I want to be a law-abiding citizen.”) and to understand the
fundamental meaning of the problem or situation (i.e., knowledge; Reyna &
Brainerd, 2011). When people fail to do this and only pay attention to superficial
3

details (e.g., numbers involved or exact phrasing of a problem) variability in their
reasoning occurs as implicated by decisions in choice tasks. The assumptions
are, according to fuzzy-trace theory, that this likely occurs because numbers are
not properly stored in long-term memory, and that retrieval of values are
unreliable in differing situations because they rely on specific cues for retrieval
(Reyna & Brainerd, 2011).
Verbatim and Gist Preference Shifts in Decision-Making
Traditional theories of rationality provided a consistency criterion; that is,
different reasoning problems should be treated consistently across trials (De
Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Reyna, 2004). For instance, if an
individual chooses to undergo surgery described as having an 80% survival rate,
the individual should also choose to undergo surgery described as having a 20%
mortality rate because they are mathematically equivalent choices (Reyna,
2004). However, this is not necessarily the case in fuzzy-trace theory. What we
see, instead, is preference shifts because of the way a decision task is phrased
(i.e., in terms of loss or gains) because dependence on gist representations and
the application of values and principles favors options differently across frames
(Broniatowski & Reyna, 2018; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). This lack of
consistency, not often displayed in younger children, suggests that adults are
less rational than children are in decision tasks; however, fuzzy-trace theory
argues that reliance on gist, which produces inconsistency, is the zenith of
4

development and rationality (Levin, Weller, Pederson, & Harshman, 2007; Reyna
& Ellis, 1994). Decisions become more efficient, quicker, and often protective
against unnecessary risks, thus increasing survival for the developed individual
(Reyna, 2012; Reyna & Lloyd, 2006).
Fuzzy-Trace Theory and Risk Perception vs. Risk-Taking
Risk-taking can, at times, incur high damage and healthcare costs, and
lost potential for people and their communities (Mills, Reyna, & Estrada, 2008).
For example, if a young person makes the risky decision to drink and drive and
the result of that decision was a fatal accident, there is lost potential of life and
costs to repair and replace damaged property. Researchers predict that risk
perception and risk-taking behavior are negatively correlated, or that perceived
risk is protective. For some, the higher the perceived risk of a behavior, the lower
the tendency to engage in the behavior (Brewer, Weinstein, Cuite, & Herrington,
2004; Mills et al., 2008). Ironically, the opposite relationship (a positive
correlation between risk perception and behavior) has also been observed: the
higher the perceived risk, the greater the tendency to engage in the behavior
(Johnson, McCaul, & Klein, 2002; Mills et al., 2008; Reyna & Farley, 2006).
Fuzzy-trace theory explains these seemingly contradictory findings by positing
that specific cues related to gist and verbatim representations elicit sometimes
positive (when verbatim is applied) and sometimes negative (when gist is
applied) relations between risk perception and risk-taking (Mills et al., 2008). For
5

example, asking an individual a question about the likelihood of getting arrested
for a crime in the next six months can cause an individual to recall specific
memories (verbatim), such as the number of crimes or offenses the individual
has recently committed (Mills et al., 2008). In contrast, asking an individual
whether they intend to engage in risky-behavior may produce a focus on the
negative consequences of risk, hence leading to a negative relationship between
risk-perception and risk-taking (Mills et al., 2008).
Susceptibility to Risk Based on Gist or Verbatim Preference
Fuzzy-trace theory states that people differ when thinking about risk
across a continuum of verbatim to gist. At one end of the continuum is qualitative
thinking, or using simple gist representations, such as “don’t go to jail.” On the
other end is quantitative thinking using verbatim representations wherein the
individual trades off risks and rewards (Mills et al., 2008). Thus, the latter thinking
preference is more susceptible to increased risk-taking behaviors, because
trading off the magnitude of risks versus the magnitude of rewards typically
favors risk-taking (Mills et al., 2008; Reyna, Wilhems, McCormick, & Weldon,
2015). More specifically, the decision maker who trades off (i.e., thinks
analytically) can perceive the magnitude of benefits as better than the magnitude
of risk involved (Mills et al., 2008). On the other hand, the decision maker who
avoids risk altogether ignores the magnitude of the possible benefits and thus, is
protective of risk (Mills et al., 2008; Reyna & Ellis, 1994; Reyna & Farley, 2006).
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For example, adolescents who think about risk in terms of gist perceive risk as
categorically bad and risk as high; therefore, they avoid risky behavior altogether
(Reyna & Casillas, 2009; Reyna & Ellis, 1994; Reyna & Farley, 2006).
Framing Effects
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), a “decision frame” is the
decision maker’s concept of the performances, outcomes, and likelihoods
associated with an option. The decision frame conception is dependent, in part,
upon the formulation of the problem, in addition to norms, habits, and personal
characteristics of the person (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Classic rational
choice requires that the preference between options should not reverse with
changes of frame when options remain mathematically equivalent; for example,
preferring to purchase meat described as 90% lean, but avoiding purchasing
when the meat is described as 10% fat. Framing effects occur when an
objectively identical decision is phrased in terms of gains or losses, provoking
different preferences for risk (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Classically, Tversky
and Kahneman (1981) developed the Asian Disease Problem to exemplify
framing effects:
Preamble: The U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of a mysterious disease
originating in the Asian-Pacific region, which is expected to kill around 600
people. The CDC proposes 2 alternative programs to combat the disease
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assuming the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the
programs are as followed:
Option 1: varies in terms of program options and is presented in terms of
gains) “If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved (72 percent
chance). If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people
will be saved, and 2/3 probabilities that no people will be saved (28
percent chance).”
After presenting the problem, participants chose between programs. Despite the
two choice options having equal expected values, the majority choice turns out to
be risk-averse, because the prospect of saving 200 lives is more attractive than
the possibility of saving zero lives (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The alternative
“frame” in which the options were presented was as follows:
Option 2: (varies in terms of program options and is presented in terms of
loss)
“If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die (22 percent). If Program D is
adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability
600 people will die (78 percent).”
The majority choice in this case, despite equal expected values between options,
is risk taking, because the certain death of 400 people is less attractive than the
high 2/3 probability that 600 will die (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
8

The only difference between the two problems is the phrasing in terms of
gains (option 1, lives saved) or losses (option 2, lives lost; Tversky & Kahneman,
1981). Framing effects provide a problem for classic decision theory because in
classical decision theory, a large assumption of rationality was that preferences
remain constant across options no matter the phrasing (De Martino et al., 2006;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Nevertheless, the pattern observed by Tversky and
Kahneman (1981) using the classic Asian Disease Problem is commonly found in
decision-making research: Choices phrased in terms of gains are often risk
averse, whereas choices phrased in terms of losses are risk seeking (De Martino
et al., 2006). If someone chooses a sure outcome over a gamble with equal or
greater expected value, their choice is considered risk-averse, but if the opposite
is observed and the individual chooses a gamble over sure option with equal or
lower expected values, their choice is then considered risk-seeking (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1984). This pattern of preference is standard in adult bias and is
referred to as “standard framing” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).
Fuzzy-trace theory explains framing effects in terms of applying verbatim
or gist to decisions in framing tasks, producing three distinct patterns of choice
(Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Reyna & Ellis, 1994; Reyna et al., 2011). First, gistbased processing often supports framing effects. Participants in these tasks
focus information first on losses, and work to minimize loss in both frames. For
gains, minimizing loss means choosing the sure option. For losses, since a loss
9

is certain for the sure option, the chance to minimize loss is present in the
gamble option. Thus, reliance on gist-based processing leads to observed
standard framing effects. Reliance on verbatim-based processing leads to two
patterns: consistency across frames and reverse framing.
Determining Gist or Verbatim in Participant Responses
Framing effects, or “standard framing,” are solely associated with gistbased decision-making in risky-choice framing tasks, the preferred mode of
thinking for most adults (Reyna et al., 2018). Standard framing is a choice pattern
of preferring sure options when options are framed in terms of gains (e.g.,
survival, winning money) but preferring the gamble when options are framed as
losses (e.g., mortality, losing money). Standard framing is related to gist
processing because when the simple, categorical representation is not there,
framing effects are not observed (Reyna et al., 2018). The opposite pattern of
choice (i.e., choosing the sure loss and the risky gain) is called “reverse framing,”
or “framing-inconsistent choice” (Reyna et al., 2018). Reyna and colleagues
(2018) explain that reverse framing is more evident when there is a greater
distinction between reward outcomes because reliance on precise distinctions
between outcomes (i.e., verbatim) rather than fuzzy representations that ignore
detail (i.e., gist) produces a cost/benefit analysis that favors the sure option in the
loss frame, but favors the gamble option in the gain frame. This indicates that
reverse framing is prevalent when the decision maker uses verbatim processing.
10

Impulsivity/Inhibition and Fuzzy-Trace Theory
When learning about gist preference choices in fuzzy-trace theory it might
be tempting to say that intuition is simply impulsivity, or lack of inhibition.
However, research using the fuzzy-trace theory framework separates intuition
from impulsivity (Reyna, 2012). Specifically, gist-based intuition is a skill that
increases from childhood through adulthood, and is linked to inhibition, or
cognitive control (Reyna, 2012; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Reyna & Rivers, 2008).
In fuzzy-trace theory, inhibition is not a reasoning mode, but rather, works to
withhold thoughts and actions as needed (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Impulsivity
likely declines with age due to maturation of the prefrontal cortex, which includes
increased white-matter connectivity between cortical and subcortical limbic areas
of the brain (Casey, Getz, & Galvan, 2008; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Inhibition,
or cognitive control over one’s behavior, is dependent on gist representations
because they are meaningful and impressionistic – decision factors that have
been shown to reduce unhealthy risky behaviors (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011;
Reyna et al., 2018). Behavioral inhibition accounts for variance in people’s
decisions in risky-choice problems (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Zuckerman, 1979).
Fuzzy-Trace Theory, Risk-Taking, Criminal Behaviors, and the Brain
Given that crimes are decisions that involve risk suggests that fuzzy-trace
theory can be applied to criminal behavior and risk. Crime can be analyzed as
reasoned, or thought out, choice that balances risks (e.g., getting caught and
11

going to jail) versus rewards (e.g., gaining monetary possessions to sell) and as
impulsive or reactive, indicating emotions or desires that supplant a person’s selfcontrol (Casey, Galván, & Somerville, 2016; Reyna, Helm, Weldon, Shah, Turpin,
& Govindgari, 2018). Like prior research, fuzzy-trace theory incorporates
influences such as reward sensitivity, emotion, and failures of inhibition on risky
decision-making tendencies (Reyna & Casillas, 2009; Reyna et al., 2018, 2015).
The largest difference is that fuzzy-trace theory incorporates a cognitive
distinction between gist and verbatim mental representations relied on in
decision-making (Reyna et al., 2018). Criminal behavior is an example of
heightened risk-taking behavior that peaks in adolescence for most individuals
but persists through adulthood for some (Cohen & Casey, 2014; Moffitt, 1993;
Reyna et al., 2018). Cohen and Casey (2014) refer to an “age-crime curve,” or
the introduction of criminal behavior that begins in adolescence and peaks at age
17. This implies that criminal behavior is reflective of developmentally immature
thinking patterns. The different preferences in risk taking behavior can be
explained by developmental and individual differences that affect reliance on gist
or verbatim representations (Reyna et al., 2018). Reyna and colleagues (2018)
posit that with respect to crime, those engaged in criminal behavior are more apt
to use trading off and analysis of risk and reward that supports risk-taking (i.e.,
committing the crime) rather than deterrence, and are supported by verbatim
representations of risk.
12

Crime and Thinking Styles
Over the years, several researchers have attempted to explain criminal
behavior with development of theories such as social disorganization theory
(Shaw & McKay, 1942); social learning theory (Burgess & Akers, 1966); strain
theory (Agnew, 1985; Merton, 1938); and rational-choice theory (Cornish &
Clarke, 1986). Social disorganization theory explains delinquent behavior by
socio-economic status and in relation to geographic location (Shaw & McKay,
1942). Like social disorganization theory, social learning theory proposes that
behavior is learned from a person’s environment (Burgess & Akers, 1966).
However, this theory focuses more on learned behavior from others over
geography. Strain theory proposes that criminal behavior stems from the
emergence of unstable social structures and blocked opportunity for achievement
(Agnew, 1985; Merton, 1938). Most closely related to fuzzy-trace theory, rationalchoice theory posits that people are rational decision makers who weigh costs
and benefits to make the most utilitarian decision (Cornish & Clarke, 1986).
Fuzzy-trace theory characterizes crime as highly risky behavior, and so it
is important to understand how risk-perception plays a part in the engagement of
criminal activity, and further, how each mode of thinking supports and predicts
risk-taking. The current study uses fuzzy-trace theory to explore how preferred
modes of thinking, risk perception, and criminal behavior are related. We first
hypothesize that if we frame criminal activity as risky behavior, we should find
13

similar thinking processes underlying both risk-taking and criminal behavior. As
explained, verbatim processing is supportive of risk-taking, while gist is protective
of risk-taking. Therefore, we can expect to see criminal behavior positively
correlated with reverse framing in a framing choice task, given that reverse
framing is indicative of verbatim processing. We also endeavor to distinguish
patterns related to gist/verbatim processing of choice from impulsivity, or
inhibition. Finally, we will explore integrating common thinking patterns found in
criminal behavior with fuzzy-trace theory.
Implications of Research
Real-World Problem: Court Decisions by Young People
Fuzzy trace-theory suggests that despite an individual’s capability for
understanding and reasoning, there are some who may have a lower capacity for
making value-based decisions when faced with tempting offers, such as whether
to engage in a criminal act (Helm & Reyna, 2017). The implication is that it is
important for individuals facing a plea, bargain, or other risky choice, to make
decisions based on their values (meaning-based representations) rather than the
immediate cost-benefit choices when weighing their options (Helm & Reyna,
2017). Furthermore, if young adults who prefer verbatim processing are also
observed to be more likely to commit criminal offenses (i.e., acts that are in
violation of the law), we can reduce their chances of future offenses with gistbased interventions, such as curriculum using gist processing (Reyna et al.,
14

2018). Using gist representations instead of verbatim representations when
processing information, such as cueing a “moral” value (e.g., “I can go to jail if I
get caught”) instead of trading off risks and rewards (e.g., “If I am caught, the fine
for stealing is $200, but if I am successful, I can get $200 from pawning this
game console”), has been found to reduce unhealthy risk-taking (Blalock &
Reyna, 2016; Reyna et al., 2018). This implies that with respect to criminal
behavior, gist-based interventions should have a protective effect against
criminal behavior, even when the risk is low, and the benefits are high (Reyna et
al., 2018).
Remember that fuzzy-trace theory suggests some people simply do not
rely on gist when faced with tempting rewards (Helm & Reyna, 2017). This study
adds to our understanding of decision-making processes in young adults when
confronted with risk and increases our understanding of factors that may lead to
criminal behavior.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from the undergraduate research pool from the
psychology department at Stephen F. Austin State University. Of the total
number of participants, one was excluded due to corrupt data from the framing
task, leaving 101 total participants. Participants were reflective of SFA’s
demographics; that is, mostly White (N = 60; 59.4%), Non-Hispanic (N = 76;
15

75.2%), female (N = 80; 79.2%), and between the ages of 18 and 43 (M = 19.97;
SD = 3.15). Participants received one research credit toward satisfying course
requirements for their participation.
Design
The study used a mixed measures approach. The experimental
component of our study was a 2 (Frame: Gain, Loss) x 3 (Reward: Small,
Intermediate, Large) x 3 (Risk: Low, Medium, High) completely factorial withinparticipants design. The correlational aspect involved a survey to measure
criminal thinking, risk-taking and criminal behavior, and impulsivity. Each scale
was presented in blocks and each block was presented in a randomized order for
each participant. A Cronbach’s Alpha score was calculated to measure internal
consistency of our scales, resulting in a high level of internal consistency with the
average Cronbach’s alpha of all scales (α) = .855.
Risky-Choice Framing Problems
The framing task included 18 risky-choice problems, counterbalanced for
whether the sure option was presented on the left or right across participants. In
this experiment, participants were tasked with choosing between a sure option
and a gamble option (i.e., the risky option). Both options in every decision
problem had equal expected values to determine thinking preference patterns,
including expected preference shifts. Each problem was a factorial combination
of a level of Frame, Risk, and Reward. There were 2 frames (a gain frame and a
16

loss frame); 3 levels of risk (i.e., low, medium, and high); and 3 levels of reward
(i.e., small, intermediate, and large). The three levels of risk are set at probable
chances of the risky option occurring in the gamble of an outcome (i.e., low=0.4,
medium=0.6, high=0.8). And the three levels of reward are set at low (small),
medium (intermediate), and high (large); the amount is dependent on the
problem and level of risk involved as determined by calculating equal expected
values for each level. An example of a small reward gain frame problem (i.e.,
Gain, Small Reward, Low Risk) involved a 100% chance of gaining an ostensible
$5 endowment in the sure option, or the 60% possibility of gaining $10 or $0 in
the gamble option, each with an expected value (EV) of 5, which is consistent
across both sure and gamble options. The loss frame problems are
mathematically identical, save for a varying endowment amount given at the
beginning of each problem and the chances are against them (or they face a
large chance loss in the gamble frame or a smaller sure loss in the sure frame).
In an example of large reward in a high-risk loss frame (i.e., Loss, Large
Reward, High Risk), a participant was given an endowment of $720 at the
beginning of the problem. The participant then chose between the sure option
(100% chance) of losing $576, and the gamble option (0.8 or 80% of losing all,
and 0.2 or 20% chance of losing nothing) with the possibilities of losing either
$720 or $0 (see Appendix A for a full description of all stimuli).
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Decision Response
Decision responses were recorded for each individual risky-choice framing
problem using E-Prime 2.0 survey software.
Adolescent Risk-Taking Questionnaire (ARQ)
Participants completed the Adolescent Risk-Taking Questionnaire (ARQ)
to assess risk-taking from self-reported risky behaviors they have participated in.
The questionnaire includes 22 items separated into four subscales: 1) thrillseeking behaviors (e.g., parachuting, roller blading); 2) rebellious behaviors (e.g.,
drinking, smoking, using illegal drugs); 3) reckless behaviors (e.g., drinking and
driving, racing, having unprotected sex); and 4) antisocial behaviors (e.g.,
cheating, teasing people) (Gullone, Moore, Moss, & Boyd, 2002). The response
format is in the form of a 5-point Likert scale from never done to done very often
(i.e., never do, hardly ever do, do sometimes, do often, do very often). Total
scores for risk-taking behavior were calculated by summing each subscale for
each participant (Min = 0, Max = 88).
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11)
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt,
1995) is a self-report questionnaire designed to assess the personality and
behavioral construct of impulsiveness. The scale has been used reliably in
research for over 50 years and is currently in its 11th revision (Barratt, 1959;
Patton et al., 1995). The 30-item questionnaire describes common impulsive
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behaviors and preferences as well as accounting for non-impulsive behaviors
(indicated by reverse-scoring) reported on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from
rarely/never to almost always/always (i.e., rarely/never, occasionally, often,
almost always/always) and separated into three subscales: 1) attentional
impulsiveness (e.g., “I have racing thoughts,” “I squirm at plays or lectures”); 2)
motor impulsiveness (e.g., “I do things without thinking,” “I act on the spur of the
moment”); and 3) nonplanning impulsiveness (e.g., “I plan tasks carefully,” “I am
more interested in the present than the future” ) (Patton et al., 1995). A total
impulsivity score was calculated by summing the subscales for each participant,
including reverse-scored items properly calculated for each subscale as
instructed by Patton and colleagues (1995) (Min = 30, Max = 120).
TCU Criminal Thinking Scales (CTS)
The TCU Criminal Thinking Scales (CTS) is a 36-item scale intended to
measure self-reported thinking patterns related to Entitlement, Justification,
Personal Irresponsibility, Power Orientation, Cold Heartedness, and Criminal
Rationalization. Entitlement (EN), at its core, conveys a sense of ownership and
privilege. Individuals who score high on the EN scale believe that they deserve
special consideration and that the world owes them (Knight, Garner, Simpson,
Morey, & Flynn, 2006). Justification (JU) reflects a thinking pattern characterized
by the offender’s minimizing the seriousness of antisocial acts and justifying
those actions based on external circumstances (Knight et al., 2006). Individuals
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who score high on this scale portray their antisocial acts as permissible due to
perceived social injustice (Knight et al., 2006). Personal Irresponsibility (PI)
assesses the degree to which an individual is willing to take ownership for their
actions, particularly criminal actions (Knight et al., 2006). High scores suggest an
individual’s unwillingness to accept responsibility for their actions and are
associated with the individual blaming others for their behavior (Knight et al.,
2006). Power Orientation (PO) measures a need for power and control (Knight et
al., 2006). Offenders who score high on the PO scale typically show an outward
display of aggression to control their external environment, and they try to
achieve a sense of power by manipulating others. Cold Heartedness (CH)
addresses callousness toward others, and high scores on this scale indicate lack
of emotional depth in personal relationships (Knight et al., 2006). Lastly, Criminal
Rationalization (CN) assesses negative viewpoints about the law and authority
figures (Knight et al., 2006). High scores on the CN scale reflect that the
individual believes their actions are no different than criminal acts authority
figures commit on a regular basis (Knight et al., 2006). Each scale was adapted
for use in our college-aged non-incarcerated population. For example, questions
that asked about the crime the perpetrator committed in the original study were
changed to speculative (“if you were to commit a crime…”). The response format
for the CTS is reported on a 5-point Likert scale from disagree strongly to agree
strongly (i.e., disagree strongly, disagree, uncertain, agree, agree strongly). A
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total CTS score was calculated by summing each scale, including reverse-coded
items on the CH and CN scales as indicated by Knight and colleagues (2006)
(Min = 36, Max = 180).
Procedure
After reading and signing a consent form, all participants completed the
framing decision task, where they were shown 18 framing problems complete
with equal amounts of gain (n = 9) and loss (n = 9) frames in random order using
E-Prime 2.0 software. Each participant was randomly assigned to see all choices
with the sure option on the left (n = 50) or sure option on the right (n = 51) for
counterbalancing. Participants assessed their own risky behavior by completing
the Adolescent Risk-taking Questionnaire (ARQ). Participants also completed the
TCU Criminal Thinking Scales (CTS), a self-report assessment for thinking
patterns associated with incarcerated criminals and adapted for use with a noncriminal college-aged population, and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) in
order to account for impulsive decision-making, or lack of inhibition, in
participants’ answers. Scales were presented in blocks and each block was
presented in random order using Qualtrics survey software for each participant.
Before finalizing, participants completed a brief survey to capture demographic
information about our sample.
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Results
Framing Choice
First, a repeated-measures analysis of variance was performed to
examine differences in choice across our participants, examining the influences
of frame, risk, and reward. Overall, each of the 101 participants completed 18
problems (ntotal = 909 gain frames; ntotal =909 loss frames). A framing task score
was created by subtracting the proportion of times the participant chose the
gamble option in the loss frame from the proportion of times the participant chose
the gamble in the gain frame, with negative scores indicating standard framing
and positive scores indicating reverse framing.

Proportion of Gambles Chosen

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
Gain

Loss

Frame
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Figure 1. Mean proportion of times gamble chosen and standard deviations
based on participant choice in gain and loss frames. Error bars (95% CI)
indicated +/- range of one standard deviation.
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was not met for
reward, χ2(2) = 9.56, p = .008 or risk, χ2(2) = 12.94, p = .002. To correct against
violations of sphericity, we reported Greenhouse-Geisser values for those
variables (ε = .916; ε = .891). A statistically significant effect of framing on choice
was found in our sample F(1, 100) = 4.260, p = .004, ηp² = .080. A reverse
framing pattern was found to emerge overall in that participants chose the
gamble option more often in the gain frame than the loss frame (Mgain =.528, SD
= .024; Mloss=.431, SD = .025, see figure 1).
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Figure 2. Mean risk scores and standard deviations based on gamble choice
across frames. Error bars (95% CI) indicated +/- range of one standard deviation.
The results show there was a significant effect of risk on taking the
gamble, F(1.78, 178.2) = 17.103, p = .000, ηp² = .274. Participants chose the
gamble less as risk increased from a low level of risk (M =.612, SD = .024) to
medium risk (M=.444, SD = .029) to high risk (M =.383, SD = .026) (see figure 2).
This suggests that participants were sensitive to and avoidant of risk, but only if
the risk was large enough (i.e., greater than 50/50).

Proportion of Gambles Chosen
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0.2

0

Reward
Figure 3. Mean reward scores and standard deviations based on gamble choice
across frames. Error bars (95% CI) indicated +/- range of one standard deviation.
A significant effect of reward on taking the gamble was also found,
F(183.3, 183.1) = 1.407, p = .037, ηp² = .057. Participants chose the gamble less
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often in the high reward condition (M =.441, SD = .022) versus the medium (M
=.495, SD = .023) or low reward conditions (M =.503, SD = .025). This effect
could be driven by an increase in appeal as the sure option becomes larger.
However, the effect could also be driven by avoidance of the large loss in the
gamble option. The current study cannot parse out which process is governing
responses. Given no interactions were found, these effects drove choice
independent of each other.
Framing Effects, Impulsivity, and Risk-Taking
A multiple regression was conducted to analyze the predictive influence
framing scores and impulsivity had on risk-taking (M = -2.82, SD = 0.98). The
results of the regression indicated the two predictors were moderately predictive
of risk-taking (R2 = .053, F(2, 98) = 2.742, p = .069, see table 1). Consistent with
previous research, it was found that impulsivity was predictive of risky behaviors
in our sample (β = .23, [.025, 347], p = .024) but not overall framing scores, (β = .034, [-.626, .442], p = .733).
Framing and Impulsivity Regression Model
Variable

b

Std.
Error

β

p

R2

Model 1
Framing Score
Impulsivity

-.092

.269

-.034

.733

.186

.081

.226

.024

25

.053

Table 1. Regression table describing framing score and impulsivity predictive
strength, significance, and explanatory power of model on risk-taking
assessment scores.

A second regression was performed and showed that, specifically, motor
impulsivity but no other subscale of impulsivity was most predictive of risky
behavior (β = .22, [-.012, .095], p = .061; R2 = .074, F(4, 96) = 1.929, p = .061,
see table 2).
Impulsivity Subscales Regression Model
Std.
Error

β

p

-.135

.244

-.065

.581

Motor Impulsivity

.469

.242

.223

.056

Non-planning Impulsivity

.224

.202

.202

.269

Variable

b

R2

Model 1
Attentional Impulsivity

.074

Table 2. Regression table describing impulsivity subscales predictive strength,
significance, and explanatory power of model on risk-taking assessment scores.
What Thinking Styles Predict Reverse Framing?
A multiple regression was conducted to analyze what criminal thinking
styles might predict framing effects, particularly the reverse framing pattern that
emerged in our sample. Framing scores were regressed onto each subscale of
criminal thinking styles. Overall, the subscales for criminal thinking styles were
not significant predictors for framing scores, R2 = .109, F(6, 94) = 1.908, p = .087
(see table 3). However, we found that criminal rationalization was significantly
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predictive of framing effects (β = .287, [.046, .392] p = .013) and that power
orientation was a marginally significant predictor of framing effects (β = -.223, p =
.066).

Thinking Styles on Framing Scores Regression Model
Variable

b

Std.
Error

β

p

R2

Model 1
Entitlement

-.135

.141

-.149

.342

Justification

.091

.140

.096

.517

Power Orientation

-.166

.089

-.223

.066

Cold Heartedness

.115

.124

.097

.355

Criminal Rationalization

.219

.087

.287

.013

Personal Irresponsibility

-.086

.132

-.087

.517

.109

Table 3. Regression table describing criminal thinking styles subscales predictive
strength, significance, and explanatory power of model on framing task scores.

What Thinking Styles Predict Risk-Taking?
A multiple regression was run to explore if criminal thinking styles predict
risk-taking, and if so, what particular subscales might predict risk-taking. An
overall criminal thinking score was significantly predictive of risk-taking (β = .257,
[.039, .271], p = .010; R2 = .066, F(1, 99) = 6.986, see table 4).
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Thinking Styles Total Regression Model
Variable

b

Std.
Error

β

p

R2

Model 1
CTS Total

.155

.058

.257

.010

.066

Table 4. Regression table describing criminal thinking style total scores predictive
strength, significance, and explanatory power of model on risk-taking
assessment scores.

A second multiple regression was conducted to further explore which
subsets of the criminal thinking scales were most predictive of risk-taking. The
findings indicated that the subscales significantly predicted risk-taking, (R2 =
.123, F(6, 94) = 2.187, p = .051, see table 5). The subscale found justification to
be most predictive of risky behavior, (β = .277, [-.038, 1.468], p = .063, see table
5).
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Thinking Styles on Risk-Taking Regression Model
Variable

b

Std.
Error

β

p

.383

.035

.821

R2

Model 1
Entitlement

.087

Justification

.715

.379

.277

.063

Power Orientation

.024

.242

.012

.920

Cold Heartedness

-.314

.336

-.097

.352

Criminal Rationalization

.302

.236

.145

.204

Personal Irresponsibility

-.165

.356

-.062

.645

.123

Table 5. Regression table describing criminal thinking subscales predictive
strength, significance, and explanatory power of model on risk-taking
assessment scores.
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Discussion
Framing Choice
A statistically significant effect of framing on choice was found in our
sample. However, inconsistent with previous research, a reverse framing pattern
was found to emerge overall in that participants chose the gamble (risky) option
more often in the gain frame than in the loss frame. Notably, a follow-up analysis
showed that participants chose the gamble option more often in the sure right
condition where they saw the gamble option first. This suggests a potential serial
positioning bias in our sample, a phenomenon that affects attentional processes
dependent on script direction (Bettinsoli, Maass, & Suitner, 2019). We did not
exclusively see standard framing choices in the sure left condition. However,
there was an increase in reverse framing present when the gamble option was
on the left. This counter-normative result may be due to the proposed serial
positioning bias, which warrants further exploration. Consistent with previous
research, there was a significant effect of risk on taking the gamble in that the
choice of gamble decreased as risk increased across frames. There was also a
significant effect of reward on choice. Given that these main effects emerged
independent of interactions suggests that choice of the gamble can be driven by
individuals focusing on the reward or focusing on the risk, but our participants
tended not to be influenced by the combination of items. This is inconsistent with
rational choice theory, which states that decision makers use all information
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available in their choice (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). In addition, the result is
not fully in support of fuzzy-trace theory, in that previous reports have found
standard framing using a similar task (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991; Reyna & Ellis,
1994); however, using less information to arrive at a decision is at the core of
fuzzy-trace theory, so the results are partially consistent with fuzzy-trace theory.
Framing Effects, Impulsivity, and Risk-Taking
Since impulsivity is not a part of the underlying thinking styles suggested
in fuzzy-trace theory but an impetus to taking risk, we expected impulsivity to be
positively related to choosing a gamble, i.e. taking risks, but not to the framing
score. The results suggest that participants’ framing score was not a good
predictor of risk-taking. However, impulsivity, especially motor impulsivity, was
found to be predictive of risk-taking. This result might be explained in
combination with previously suggested serial positioning bias (Bettinsoli et al.,
2018). In other words, when participants saw something they liked first (i.e.,
higher reward on the left), they were drawn to choose that option more often as
impulsivity increased. This result is consistent with previous research showing
that impulsivity is a strong predictor of risk-taking (Zuckerman, 1979).
What Thinking Style Predicts Reverse Framing?
Based on the implications of fuzzy-trace theory and framing effects, we
planned to observe that young adults who prefer verbatim processing would also
be more likely to take risks, including criminal risks. Although the tendency to
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rationalize was related to the tendency to reverse frame in choice, framing scores
were not predictive of risk-taking. However, we found that criminal rationalization
was significantly predictive of framing effects, as fuzzy-trace theory would
suggest. We originally predicted that justification would be predictive of reverse
framing as a verbatim-related measure of criminal thinking styles, but results did
not support that hypothesis. Instead, the power orientation subscale was found to
be moderately predictive of reverse framing effects. There is not a clear
understanding of this relationship between power orientation and framing scores.
It is possible that these results are reflective of the lack of criminal activity and
phrasing in the power orientation items. Statements for power orientation involve
the concept of control and are not necessarily related to crime or court
proceedings like most of the other criminal thinking subscales. This would not
activate gist-related biases (i.e., avoiding associations with criminal labels or
criminal risks) as much for our non-criminal sample, possibly driving the results
observed between power orientation and reverse framing. Overall, the individual
subscales for criminal thinking styles were not significant predictors for framing
scores.
What Thinking Styles Predict Risk-Taking?
Our results indicated an overall criminal thinking score was predictive of
risk-taking behavior. We proposed that the criminal rationalization and
justification subscales of the CTS are related to verbatim-processing, as fuzzy32

trace theory would suggest (Reyna et al., 2018). The findings indicated that a
small portion of variance can be explained by the subscales and that the
subscales overall significantly predicted risk-taking. Justification was moderately
predictive of risk-taking, indicating those who use external circumstances as
justification for antisocial acts are more likely to take risks (Knight et al., 2006).
Therefore, it is not clear which specific criminal thinking styles might strongly
predict risk-taking. Nevertheless, our results suggest there is a pattern to risktaking when taking multiple facets of criminal thinking into account.
Implications
Consistent with previous research, our study found that there were
significant differences among groups due to experimental conditions of frame,
risk, and reward levels. In order to further understand what existing attributes
influenced the decision-makers’ choice to take risk, we explored relationships
between framing scores and risky behaviors, impulsivity, and criminal thinking
styles. Although framing scores could not predict any of our participants’ existing
attributes, some attributes were predictive of framing effects. Impulsivity was
significantly predictive of risk-taking, particularly, motor impulsivity.
We expected criminal rationalization to predictive of framing effects and in
particular, reverse framing. This expectation was supported by our results,
indicating that the existing thinking style is likely related to verbatim-processing
when choosing to take risks in a framing task. We did not find the expectation
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that justification was predictive of reverse framing. Instead, we found that power
orientation was moderately predictive of reverse framing. As explained before,
we believe this may be due to the phrasing in these control-related questions,
which would not bring forth gist representation biases about criminals and
criminal risk when participants were answering those questions in the risk-taking
survey. This may have driven the relationship between power orientation and
reverse framing.
Finally, we explored what thinking styles are related to risk-taking and
found that, overall, scores on the criminal thinking scales were predictive of risktaking. This supports previous findings by Knight and colleagues (2006).
Contrary to our initial hypothesis, there was not a particular thinking style
associated with predicting risk-taking. We predict that may have not been the
case in a sample with greater risk-score variability.
Limitations
A large limitation of this study includes non-diverse demographics in our
sample, including age-restriction and predominant sex and race representations.
The participants were largely reflective of the population at SFA: the age-range
was rather wide, but over half of our participants were between 19-20 years of
age; only 21 males were represented in our sample of 101; and over half of our
sample identified as White or European American. It is possible that range
restriction in either verbatim/gist variation, a known developmental effect, or in
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criminal thinking or risky behavior, both known to be greater for males than
females, may have limited our ability to detect differences (Byrnes, Miller, &
Schafer, 1999). For example, the total score one can obtain on the Adolescent
Risk-taking Questionnaire is 88, while the mean scores for our sample were 43.6
(SD = 8.1), with many scores even lower than that (Min = 28, Max = 69). Of note,
our sample was college students and not convicted criminals in a prison
population. It is possible that although young adults are likely to take risks, many
college students do not engage in a large volume of criminal activity. We believe
that the relationships we expected to see between risk-taking and our other
variables would be present in a more diverse sample.
Future Directions
As stated briefly in the discussion, future studies should explore where
participants are looking first and what items they fixate on when participating in a
framing choice task. This might rule out or further support the idea that serial
positioning biases have a role in risky-decision making in framing tasks. Further,
criminal rationalization was predictive of reverse framing in our sample. These
items reflect subjectively negative views of justice and systematic issues, and our
sample largely reflected those views in conjunction with using more reverse
framing processes in decision making. This relationship should be explored
further to add to our understanding of how criminal rationalization predicts
reverse framing. A final suggestion is that future studies can look at the concept
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of locus of control in relation to criminal thinking styles and fuzzy-trace theory.
This may further explain how criminal rationalization is predictive of reverse
framing, how justification is predictive of risk-taking, or why people choose the
gamble option in framing tasks. For example, an internal locus of control may
reflect more gist-based processing, indicating protective relationships between
risk-perceptions and risk-taking, while an external locus of control may reflect
verbatim processing, suggesting a positive relationship between risk-perception
and risk-taking.
Conclusion
In conclusion, results indicate that individuals did not take into
consideration multiple factors when deciding to take a gamble or not but focused
on either factors risk or reward, as no interaction between risk and reward was
found. In support of previous findings, impulsivity was largely predictive of risktaking but not predictive of framing effects (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Zuckerman,
1979). Moreover, motor impulsivity was specifically predictive of risk-taking.
Criminal rationalization and power orientation were found to be significantly
predictive of reverse framing, indicating these subscales may be most related to
verbatim-processing in risky decisions. Overall higher scores on the CTS,
measuring the tendency to endorse items found to be related to criminal
behavior, were predictive of more general risk-taking, suggesting that analyzing
criminal behavior as a form of risk-taking is warranted. In understanding the
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precursors to criminal behavior, including how risk is conceptualized, processed,
and values, more effective interventions centered around known relations of
patterns of thinking to risk can aid in reduction of criminal activity. Further,
understanding how risk perceptions may develop towards more protective as
opposed to more reflective will further aid the effectiveness of interventions.
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APPENDIX A
Risky-Choice Framing Problems
GAIN FRAME
Option

Risk

0.4

Small Outcomes

EV = 12

0.6

0.8

Sure

12

12

12

Gamble

20,0

30,0

60,0

Intermediate Outcomes

EV = 36

Sure

36

36

36

Gamble

60,0

90,0

180,0

Large Outcomes

EV = 144

Sure

144
240,0

144

144

360,0

720,0

Risk

0.4

0.6

0.8

Small Outcomes

EV = 12

Endowment

20

30

60

Sure

-8

-18

-48

Gamble

-30,0

-60,0

Intermediate Outcomes

-20,0
EV = 36

Endowment

60

90

180

Sure

-24

-54

-144

Gamble

-90,0

-180,0

Large Outcomes

-60,0
EV = 144

Endowment

240

360

720

Sure

-96

-216

-576

Gamble

-240,0

-360,0

-720,0

Gamble
LOSS FRAME
Option
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APPENDIX B
Adolescent Risk-taking Questionnaire (ARQ)
DIRECTIONS
Below is written a list of behaviors some people engage in. Read each one carefully and select
the box in front of the word that best describes your behavior.
There are no right or wrong answers.
Never Done

1. Smoking
2. Roller blading
3. Drinking and driving
4. Parachuting
5. Speeding
6. Stealing cars and
going for joy rides
7. Tao Kwon Do fighting
8. Underage drinking
9. Staying out late
10. Driving without a
license
11. Talking to strangers
12. Flying a plane
13. Cheating
14. Getting drunk
15. Sniffing gas or glue
16. Having unprotected
sex
17. Leaving school
18. Teasing and picking
on people
19. Snow skiing
20. Taking drugs
21. Overeating
22. Entering a
competition

Hardly Ever Done

Done Sometimes

Done Often

Done Very Often
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APPENDIX C
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11)
DIRECTIONS: People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations. This is a test to
measure some of the ways in which you act and think. Read each statement and put an X on the
appropriate circle on the right side of this page. Do not spend too much time on any statement.
Answer quickly and honestly.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Rarely/Never

Occasionally

Often

Almost Always/Always





































































































































I plan tasks carefully.
I do things without thinking.
I make-up my mind quickly.
I am happy-go-lucky.
I don’t “pay attention.”
I have “racing” thoughts.
I plan trips well ahead of time.
I am self-controlled.
I concentrate easily.
I save regularly.
I “squirm” at plays or lectures.
I am a careful thinker.
I plan for job security.
I say things without thinking.
I like to think about complex
problems.
I change jobs.
I act “on impulse.”
I get easily bored when solving
thought problems.
I act on the spur of the moment.
I am a steady thinker.
I change residences.
I buy things on impulse.
I can only think about one thing at a
time
I change hobbies.
I spend or charge more than I earn.
I often have extraneous thoughts
when thinking.
I am more interested in the present
than the future.

45

28. I am restless at the theater or
during lectures.
29. I like puzzles.
30. I am future oriented.
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APPENDIX D
TCU Criminal Thinking Scales
TCU CTSFORM
Disagree Strongly
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Uncertain Agree
(3) (4)

Agree Strongly
(5)

Please indicate how much you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement.
1. You get upset when you hear about
someone who has lost everything
in a natural disaster. ................................. 









2. You got in trouble because you had
a run of bad luck. ..................................... 









3. The real reason you get in trouble is
because of your race. .............................. 









4. When people tell you what to do,
you become aggressive. .......................... 









5. Anything can be fixed in court if you
have the right connections. ...................... 









6. Seeing someone cry makes you sad. ....... 









7. You rationalize your actions with
statements like “Everyone else is
doing it, so why shouldn’t I?” .................... 









8. Bankers, lawyers, and politicians get
away with breaking the law every day. ..... 









9. You have paid your dues in life and are
justified in taking what you want. .............. 









10. When not in control of a situation,
you feel the need to exert power
over others. .............................................. 
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11. When being asked about the motives
for engaging in illegal activity, you point
out how hard your life has been. .............. 









You are sometimes so moved by an
experience that you feel emotions
you cannot describe. ................................ 









13. You argue with others over relatively
trivial matters. .......................................... 









14. If someone disrespects you then you
have to straighten them out, even if you
have to get physical. ................................ 









15. You like to be in control. ........................... 









16. You find yourself blaming those affected
by your illegal behavior. ........................... 









17. You feel people are important to you. ....... 









18. This country’s justice system was
designed to treat everyone equally. ......... 









19. Police do worse things than do the
“criminals” they lock up. ........................... 









20. You think you have to pay back people
who mess with you. .................................. 









21. Nothing you do here is going to make a
difference in the way you are treated. ...... 









22. You feel you are above the law. ............... 









23. It is okay to do illegal things in order to pay
for the things you need. ............................ 









24. Society owes you a better life. .................. 









25. Breaking the law is no big deal as long
as you do not physically harm someone. . 









26. You find yourself blaming society and
external circumstances for the problems
in your life. ............................................... 
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27. You worry when a friend is having
problems. ................................................. 









28. The only way to protect yourself
is to be ready to fight. ............................... 









29. You are not to blame for everything
you have done. ........................................ 









30. It is unfair that you suffer the consequences
when bankers, lawyers, and politicians get
away with their crimes. ............................. 









31. Laws are just a way to keep poor people
down. ....................................................... 









32. Your good behavior should allow you
to be irresponsible sometimes. ................. 









33. It is okay to commit crime in order to
live the life you deserve. ........................... 









34. Prosecutors often tell witnesses to lie
in court. .................................................... 









35. You justify the illegal things you do by
telling yourself that if you had not done
it, someone else would have. ................... 









36. You may be a law-breaker, but your
environment made you that way. ............. 
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